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[96.237.52.46]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id dt2-20020a05620a478200b006bb024c5021sm11980062qkb.25.2022.08.22.14.21.08 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 22 Aug 2022 14:21:08 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [PATCH 1/3] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op From: Paul Moore To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Luis Chamberlain Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 17:21:07 -0400 Message-ID: <166120326788.369593.18304806499678048620.stgit@olly> In-Reply-To: <166120321387.369593.7400426327771894334.stgit@olly> References: <166120321387.369593.7400426327771894334.stgit@olly> User-Agent: StGit/1.5 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: io-uring@vger.kernel.org From: Luis Chamberlain io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details. This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file operation. [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca.com Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain Acked-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++ include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++ io_uring/uring_cmd.c | 5 +++++ security/security.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 806448173033..60fff133c0b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -407,4 +407,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event) #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 84a0d7e02176..3aa6030302f5 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1582,6 +1582,9 @@ * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling * thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). * + * @uring_cmd: + * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. + * */ union security_list_options { #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1bc362cb413f..7bd0c490703d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2060,6 +2060,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new); extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void); +extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd); #else static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) { @@ -2069,6 +2070,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_sqpoll(void) { return 0; } +static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c index 8e0cc2d9205e..0f7ad956ddcb 100644 --- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c +++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (!req->file->f_op->uring_cmd) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + ret = security_uring_cmd(ioucmd); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQE128) issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_SQE128; if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_CQE32) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 14d30fec8a00..4b95de24bc8d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2660,4 +2660,8 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void) { return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); } +int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) +{ + return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); +} #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */