From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>,
Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 17:21:13 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166120327379.369593.4939320600435400704.stgit@olly> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <166120321387.369593.7400426327771894334.stgit@olly>
Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the
existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new
permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the
object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the
target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule
is shown below:
allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd };
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79573504783b..03bca97c8b29 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -6987,6 +6988,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
/*
@@ -7231,6 +7254,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ff757ae5f253..1c2f41ff4e55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "io_uring",
- { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-22 21:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-22 21:21 [PATCH 0/3] LSM hooks for IORING_OP_URING_CMD Paul Moore
2022-08-22 21:21 ` [PATCH 1/3] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op Paul Moore
2022-08-23 6:53 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-23 16:48 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-24 6:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-24 14:00 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-22 21:21 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2022-08-23 6:52 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-23 16:49 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <CGME20220901201553eucas1p258ee1cba97c888aab172d31d9c06e922@eucas1p2.samsung.com>
2022-09-01 20:15 ` Joel Granados
2022-09-01 21:30 ` Paul Moore
2022-09-07 8:17 ` Joel Granados
2022-09-16 12:59 ` Joel Granados
2022-08-22 21:21 ` [PATCH 3/3] /dev/null: add IORING_OP_URING_CMD support Paul Moore
2022-08-22 22:36 ` Jens Axboe
2022-08-22 23:09 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-22 23:13 ` Jens Axboe
2022-08-22 23:19 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-22 23:25 ` Jens Axboe
2022-08-22 23:37 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-23 6:51 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-23 13:33 ` Jens Axboe
2022-08-23 17:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-23 6:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-23 17:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-24 6:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-08-24 14:06 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-26 16:27 ` [PATCH 0/3] LSM hooks for IORING_OP_URING_CMD Paul Moore
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