From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B8FDC0015E for ; Tue, 11 Jul 2023 20:51:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230314AbjGKUvI (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jul 2023 16:51:08 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:53144 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230078AbjGKUvH (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jul 2023 16:51:07 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-x435.google.com (mail-pf1-x435.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::435]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8D94110E3 for ; Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:51:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pf1-x435.google.com with SMTP id d2e1a72fcca58-676cc97ca74so1394047b3a.1 for ; Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:51:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel-dk.20221208.gappssmtp.com; s=20221208; t=1689108665; x=1689713465; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:date:message-id:subject :references:in-reply-to:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=4KQjS5IB3HxBUPRZ52PjYkeXdm3xeIYaSrFkecAH7Y8=; b=Yg8x27vG/jo6ntfVpqL8SMdc3Am7rOf3C7GPs7yktDM+ZCn1UZeK40SAnkL01dlsV4 UV3H+VsihfkXwmmDVvR8Bp7NbGejdB7OkPyrboUWGD10jjFZvA7ujOiXM0wKU8ICxCa9 mhjH+wEBOxEY1/vBCewgN6lm5PkMnN0sfDKN0C8W2jf00OuT7utWoK+M/Yo5mMdlTcb2 N3Jv/ubTq/TgNQhiTmxnuGB+2RUcCikJDdu/em9DUt8s6T0QbiacuYCWMop1NvbK+fHa HykDUrvNmHuUudYMqoYnAO+WTHE+TVMR6migYeCZIoxOePT3b0g7Gnjl/vY/uB85/xqC 4wtg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1689108665; x=1689713465; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:date:message-id:subject :references:in-reply-to:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=4KQjS5IB3HxBUPRZ52PjYkeXdm3xeIYaSrFkecAH7Y8=; b=QUU/UKicY3aRDU2yjSBXWgqM2Ac2hmf0CAi2ZHJqA9L4xbU7UOFULmtfNjuFw/ohNs C9fZQmYaO+hRlcUkmbWX6qYGGUsPnwfBEuz7LvKB7hC/TkWu2p+QIdK31IoAgUz+sa2Z /WCgfbz/A/vRrmrkv4XWegJD9UCa924caJOgaHjktQ6NQhIOm4rcrpPtcY3wagiud1SR E+pU298F5K3jpOlO5x78Gv8hLWZzGOrrMkroPM12JCNNCNR0/F8r3/spEHAcM7zBiVzT lzann/COpF48TsLGK9pD4j2va7f0+MLr3GyUFtuAB4ph3DlWjKq8C1JVbWUpktF95pi3 /ZYA== X-Gm-Message-State: ABy/qLbVNZv4ozxakjVGMklEeGQSlzIYGaqf52Zwtw2+J647wpUKeLdj RybW+jQZ480Wxe62JqMDUSlVLEJIuJYyEm9IQFw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APBJJlFiXWlodvDO3oWvF0y1nyHpjI/oSicwjLwdAwZM3FzbLVW/18gjH31OMzxUAL3pjMrR0gZrqg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6a00:e8e:b0:677:3439:874a with SMTP id bo14-20020a056a000e8e00b006773439874amr18907425pfb.3.1689108665547; Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:51:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [127.0.0.1] ([198.8.77.157]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id w19-20020aa78593000000b0067886c78745sm2148776pfn.66.2023.07.11.13.51.03 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:51:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Jens Axboe To: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, io-uring@vger.kernel.org, asml.silence@gmail.com, Matteo Rizzo Cc: corbet@lwn.net, akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, ribalda@chromium.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, jannh@google.com, chenhuacai@kernel.org, gpiccoli@igalia.com, ldufour@linux.ibm.com, evn@google.com, poprdi@google.com, jordyzomer@google.com, jmoyer@redhat.com, krisman@suse.de In-Reply-To: <20230630151003.3622786-1-matteorizzo@google.com> References: <20230630151003.3622786-1-matteorizzo@google.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Message-Id: <168910866387.217585.15007808058378960214.b4-ty@kernel.dk> Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 14:51:03 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-099c9 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: io-uring@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 30 Jun 2023 15:10:02 +0000, Matteo Rizzo wrote: > Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in > io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain > control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables > the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide. > > The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud > providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring > where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For > example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by > default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that > requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the > machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring > a kernel recompilation or a reboot. > > [...] Applied, thanks! [1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide commit: d55f54dac19a0cee1818353ab5aa3edac9034db4 Best regards, -- Jens Axboe