From: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>, Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>,
Kees Cook <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
Kernel Hardening <[email protected]>,
Jann Horn <[email protected]>, Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>,
Christian Brauner <[email protected]>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>,
[email protected],
Alexander Viro <[email protected]>,
Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests
Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 18:20:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200710162017.qdu34ermtxh3rfgl@steredhat> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Hi Konrad,
On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 11:33:09AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> .snip..
> > Just to recap the proposal, the idea is to add some restrictions to the
> > operations (sqe, register, fixed file) to safely allow untrusted applications
> > or guests to use io_uring queues.
>
> Hi!
>
> This is neat and quite cool - but one thing that keeps nagging me is
> what how much overhead does this cut from the existing setup when you use
> virtio (with guests obviously)?
I need to do more tests, but the preliminary results that I reported on
the original proposal [1] show an overhead of ~ 4.17 uS (with iodepth=1)
when I'm using virtio ring processed in a dedicated iothread:
- 73 kIOPS using virtio-blk + QEMU iothread + io_uring backend
- 104 kIOPS using io_uring passthrough
> That is from a high level view the
> beaty of io_uring being passed in the guest is you don't have the
> virtio ring -> io_uring processing, right?
Right, and potentially we can share the io_uring queues directly to the
guest userspace applications, cutting down the cost of Linux block
layer in the guest.
Thanks for your feedback,
Stefano
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredhat/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-10 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-10 14:19 [PATCH RFC 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-10 14:19 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-10 14:19 ` [PATCH RFC 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-10 17:52 ` Jens Axboe
2020-07-13 8:07 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-10 14:19 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-10 15:33 ` [PATCH RFC 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2020-07-10 16:20 ` Stefano Garzarella [this message]
2020-07-13 9:24 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
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