From: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
To: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>,
Jann Horn <[email protected]>, Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>,
[email protected], Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>,
Kees Cook <[email protected]>,
Alexander Viro <[email protected]>,
Kernel Hardening <[email protected]>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>,
[email protected], Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>,
[email protected]
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 17:32:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
permanently installs a feature allowlist on an io_ring_ctx.
The io_ring_ctx can then be passed to untrusted code with the
knowledge that only operations present in the allowlist can be
executed.
The allowlist approach ensures that new features added to io_uring
do not accidentally become available when an existing application
is launched on a newer kernel version.
Currently is it possible to restrict sqe opcodes, sqe flags, and
register opcodes.
IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS can only be made once. Afterwards
it is not possible to change restrictions anymore.
This prevents untrusted code from removing restrictions.
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
---
v3:
- added IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_ALLOWED and
IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_REQUIRED
- removed IORING_RESTRICTION_FIXED_FILES_ONLY
RFC v2:
- added 'restricted' flag in the ctx [Jens]
- added IORING_MAX_RESTRICTIONS define
- returned EBUSY instead of EINVAL when restrictions are already
registered
- reset restrictions if an error happened during the registration
---
fs/io_uring.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h | 31 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
index 1ec25ee71372..cb365e6e0af7 100644
--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@
#define IORING_MAX_FILES_TABLE (1U << IORING_FILE_TABLE_SHIFT)
#define IORING_FILE_TABLE_MASK (IORING_MAX_FILES_TABLE - 1)
#define IORING_MAX_FIXED_FILES (64 * IORING_MAX_FILES_TABLE)
+#define IORING_MAX_RESTRICTIONS (IORING_RESTRICTION_LAST + \
+ IORING_REGISTER_LAST + IORING_OP_LAST)
struct io_uring {
u32 head ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
@@ -219,6 +221,13 @@ struct io_buffer {
__u16 bid;
};
+struct io_restriction {
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(register_op, IORING_REGISTER_LAST);
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(sqe_op, IORING_OP_LAST);
+ u8 sqe_flags_allowed;
+ u8 sqe_flags_required;
+};
+
struct io_ring_ctx {
struct {
struct percpu_ref refs;
@@ -231,6 +240,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
unsigned int cq_overflow_flushed: 1;
unsigned int drain_next: 1;
unsigned int eventfd_async: 1;
+ unsigned int restricted: 1;
/*
* Ring buffer of indices into array of io_uring_sqe, which is
@@ -338,6 +348,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
struct llist_head file_put_llist;
struct work_struct exit_work;
+ struct io_restriction restrictions;
};
/*
@@ -6353,6 +6364,19 @@ static int io_init_req(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_kiocb *req,
if (unlikely(sqe_flags & ~SQE_VALID_FLAGS))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(ctx->restricted)) {
+ if (!test_bit(req->opcode, ctx->restrictions.sqe_op))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if ((sqe_flags & ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_required) !=
+ ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_required)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (sqe_flags & ~(ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_allowed |
+ ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_required))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
if ((sqe_flags & IOSQE_BUFFER_SELECT) &&
!io_op_defs[req->opcode].buffer_select)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -8650,6 +8674,76 @@ static int io_unregister_personality(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned id)
return -EINVAL;
}
+static int io_register_restrictions(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, void __user *arg,
+ unsigned int nr_args)
+{
+ struct io_uring_restriction *res;
+ size_t size;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ /* We allow only a single restrictions registration */
+ if (ctx->restricted)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (!arg || nr_args > IORING_MAX_RESTRICTIONS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = array_size(nr_args, sizeof(*res));
+ if (size == SIZE_MAX)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ res = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!res)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(res, arg, size)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_args; i++) {
+ switch (res[i].opcode) {
+ case IORING_RESTRICTION_REGISTER_OP:
+ if (res[i].register_op >= IORING_REGISTER_LAST) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ __set_bit(res[i].register_op,
+ ctx->restrictions.register_op);
+ break;
+ case IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP:
+ if (res[i].sqe_op >= IORING_OP_LAST) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ __set_bit(res[i].sqe_op, ctx->restrictions.sqe_op);
+ break;
+ case IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_ALLOWED:
+ ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_allowed = res[i].sqe_flags;
+ break;
+ case IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_REQUIRED:
+ ctx->restrictions.sqe_flags_required = res[i].sqe_flags;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->restricted = 1;
+
+ ret = 0;
+out:
+ /* Reset all restrictions if an error happened */
+ if (ret != 0)
+ memset(&ctx->restrictions, 0, sizeof(ctx->restrictions));
+
+ kfree(res);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static bool io_register_op_must_quiesce(int op)
{
switch (op) {
@@ -8696,6 +8790,18 @@ static int __io_uring_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned opcode,
if (ret) {
percpu_ref_resurrect(&ctx->refs);
ret = -EINTR;
+ goto out_quiesce;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->restricted) {
+ if (opcode >= IORING_REGISTER_LAST) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!test_bit(opcode, ctx->restrictions.register_op)) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
}
@@ -8759,15 +8865,19 @@ static int __io_uring_register(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned opcode,
break;
ret = io_unregister_personality(ctx, nr_args);
break;
+ case IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS:
+ ret = io_register_restrictions(ctx, arg, nr_args);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+out:
if (io_register_op_must_quiesce(opcode)) {
/* bring the ctx back to life */
percpu_ref_reinit(&ctx->refs);
-out:
+out_quiesce:
reinit_completion(&ctx->ref_comp);
}
return ret;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
index cdc98afbacc3..be54bc3cf173 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ enum {
IORING_REGISTER_PROBE,
IORING_REGISTER_PERSONALITY,
IORING_UNREGISTER_PERSONALITY,
+ IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS,
/* this goes last */
IORING_REGISTER_LAST
@@ -295,4 +296,34 @@ struct io_uring_probe {
struct io_uring_probe_op ops[0];
};
+struct io_uring_restriction {
+ __u16 opcode;
+ union {
+ __u8 register_op; /* IORING_RESTRICTION_REGISTER_OP */
+ __u8 sqe_op; /* IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP */
+ __u8 sqe_flags; /* IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_* */
+ };
+ __u8 resv;
+ __u32 resv2[3];
+};
+
+/*
+ * io_uring_restriction->opcode values
+ */
+enum {
+ /* Allow an io_uring_register(2) opcode */
+ IORING_RESTRICTION_REGISTER_OP,
+
+ /* Allow an sqe opcode */
+ IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP,
+
+ /* Allow sqe flags */
+ IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_ALLOWED,
+
+ /* Require sqe flags (these flags must be set on each submission) */
+ IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_FLAGS_REQUIRED,
+
+ IORING_RESTRICTION_LAST
+};
+
#endif
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-13 15:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-13 15:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-26 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-26 19:52 ` Andreas Dilger
2020-08-27 7:11 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` Stefano Garzarella [this message]
2020-08-26 19:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:12 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:18 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-27 15:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-25 15:20 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 16:47 ` Jens Axboe
2020-08-26 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:24 ` Stefano Garzarella
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