From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
To: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>, [email protected]
Cc: syzbot <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected]
Subject: Re: [syzbot] WARNING in mntput_no_expire (2)
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 19:59:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210401175919.jpiylhfrlb4xb67u@wittgenstein> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210401174613.vymhhrfsemypougv@wittgenstein>
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 07:46:13PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 10:09:18AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > On 4/1/21 9:45 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 02:09:20AM -0700, syzbot wrote:
> > >> Hello,
> > >>
> > >> syzbot found the following issue on:
> > >>
> > >> HEAD commit: d19cc4bf Merge tag 'trace-v5.12-rc5' of git://git.kernel.o..
> > >> git tree: upstream
> > >> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1018f281d00000
> > >> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d1a3d65a48dbd1bc
> > >> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c88a7030da47945a3cc3
> > >> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=12f50d11d00000
> > >> C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=137694a1d00000
> > >>
> > >> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > >> Reported-by: [email protected]
> > >>
> > >> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > >> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8409 at fs/namespace.c:1186 mntput_no_expire+0xaca/0xcb0 fs/namespace.c:1186
> > >> Modules linked in:
> > >> CPU: 1 PID: 8409 Comm: syz-executor035 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
> > >> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> > >> RIP: 0010:mntput_no_expire+0xaca/0xcb0 fs/namespace.c:1186
> > >> Code: ff 48 c7 c2 e0 cb 78 89 be c2 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 cb 78 89 c6 05 e5 6d e5 0b 01 e8 ff e1 f6 06 e9 3f fd ff ff e8 c6 a5 a8 ff <0f> 0b e9 fc fc ff ff e8 ba a5 a8 ff e8 55 dc 94 ff 31 ff 89 c5 89
> > >> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000165fc78 EFLAGS: 00010293
> > >> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff920002cbf95 RCX: 0000000000000000
> > >> RDX: ffff88802072d4c0 RSI: ffffffff81cb4b8a RDI: 0000000000000003
> > >> RBP: ffff888011656900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8fa978af
> > >> R10: ffffffff81cb4884 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000008
> > >> R13: ffffc9000165fcc8 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
> > >> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > >> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > >> CR2: 000055a722053160 CR3: 000000000bc8e000 CR4: 00000000001506e0
> > >> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > >> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > >> Call Trace:
> > >> mntput fs/namespace.c:1232 [inline]
> > >> cleanup_mnt+0x523/0x530 fs/namespace.c:1132
> > >> task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:140
> > >> exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:30 [inline]
> > >> do_exit+0xbfc/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:825
> > >> do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
> > >> __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:933 [inline]
> > >> __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:931 [inline]
> > >> __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:931
> > >> do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
> > >> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> > >> RIP: 0033:0x446af9
> > >> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x446acf.
> > >> RSP: 002b:00000000005dfe48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
> > >> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004ce450 RCX: 0000000000446af9
> > >> RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
> > >> RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffbc R09: 0000000000000000
> > >> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004ce450
> > >> R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
> > >
> > > [+Cc Jens + io_uring]
> > >
> > > Hm, this reproducer uses io_uring and it's the io_uring_enter() that
> > > triggers this reliably. With this reproducer I've managed to reproduce
> > > the issue on v5.12-rc4, and v5.12-rc3, v5.12-rc2 and v5.12-rc1.
> > > It's not reproducible at
> > > 9820b4dca0f9c6b7ab8b4307286cdace171b724d
> > > which is the commit immediately before the first v5.12 io_uring merge.
> > > It's first reproducible with the first io_uring merge for v5.12, i.e.
> > > 5bbb336ba75d95611a7b9456355b48705016bdb1
> >
> > Thanks, that's good info. I'll take a look at it and see if I can
> > reproduce.
>
> Ok, I was deep into this anyway and it didn't make much sense to do
> anything else at that point so I bisected this a bit further. The first
> bad commit is:
>
> commit 3a81fd02045c329f25e5900fa61f613c9b317644
> Author: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
> Date: Thu Dec 10 12:25:36 2020 -0700
>
> io_uring: enable LOOKUP_CACHED path resolution for filename lookups
>
> Instead of being pessimistic and assume that path lookup will block, use
> LOOKUP_CACHED to attempt just a cached lookup. This ensures that the
> fast path is always done inline, and we only punt to async context if
> IO is needed to satisfy the lookup.
>
> For forced nonblock open attempts, mark the file O_NONBLOCK over the
> actual ->open() call as well. We can safely clear this again before
> doing fd_install(), so it'll never be user visible that we fiddled with
> it.
>
> This greatly improves the performance of file open where the dentry is
> already cached:
>
> ached 5.10-git 5.10-git+LOOKUP_CACHED Speedup
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> 33% 1,014,975 900,474 1.1x
> 89% 545,466 292,937 1.9x
> 100% 435,636 151,475 2.9x
>
> The more cache hot we are, the faster the inline LOOKUP_CACHED
> optimization helps. This is unsurprising and expected, as a thread
> offload becomes a more dominant part of the total overhead. If we look
> at io_uring tracing, doing an IORING_OP_OPENAT on a file that isn't in
> the dentry cache will yield:
>
> 275.550481: io_uring_create: ring 00000000ddda6278, fd 3 sq size 8, cq size 16, flags 0
> 275.550491: io_uring_submit_sqe: ring 00000000ddda6278, op 18, data 0x0, non block 1, sq_thread 0
> 275.550498: io_uring_queue_async_work: ring 00000000ddda6278, request 00000000c0267d17, flags 69760, normal queue, work 000000003d683991
> 275.550502: io_uring_cqring_wait: ring 00000000ddda6278, min_events 1
> 275.550556: io_uring_complete: ring 00000000ddda6278, user_data 0x0, result 4
>
> which shows a failed nonblock lookup, then punt to worker, and then we
> complete with fd == 4. This takes 65 usec in total. Re-running the same
> test case again:
>
> 281.253956: io_uring_create: ring 0000000008207252, fd 3 sq size 8, cq size 16, flags 0
> 281.253967: io_uring_submit_sqe: ring 0000000008207252, op 18, data 0x0, non block 1, sq_thread 0
> 281.253973: io_uring_complete: ring 0000000008207252, user_data 0x0, result 4
>
> shows the same request completing inline, also returning fd == 4. This
> takes 6 usec.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
I _think_ I see what the issue is. It seems that an assumption made in
this commit might be wrong and we're missing a mnt_add_count() bump that
we would otherwise have gotten if we've moved the failure handling into
the unlazy helpers themselves.
Al, does that sound plausible?
commit eacd9aa8cedeb412842c7b339adbaa0477fdd5ad
Author: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Feb 15 12:03:23 2021 -0500
fix handling of nd->depth on LOOKUP_CACHED failures in try_to_unlazy*
After switching to non-RCU mode, we want nd->depth to match the number
of entries in nd->stack[] that need eventual path_put().
legitimize_links() takes care of that on failures; unfortunately,
failure exits added for LOOKUP_CACHED do not.
We could add the logics for that into those failure exits, both in
try_to_unlazy() and in try_to_unlazy_next(), but since both checks
are immediately followed by legitimize_links() and there's no calls
of legitimize_links() other than those two... It's easier to
move the check (and required handling of nd->depth on failure) into
legitimize_links() itself.
[caught by Jens: ... and since we are zeroing ->depth here, we need
to do drop_links() first]
Fixes: 6c6ec2b0a3e0 "fs: add support for LOOKUP_CACHED"
Tested-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 4cae88733a5c..de74ad2bc6e2 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -630,6 +630,11 @@ static inline bool legitimize_path(struct nameidata *nd,
static bool legitimize_links(struct nameidata *nd)
{
int i;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_CACHED)) {
+ drop_links(nd);
+ nd->depth = 0;
+ return false;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < nd->depth; i++) {
struct saved *last = nd->stack + i;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_path(nd, &last->link, last->seq))) {
@@ -686,8 +691,6 @@ static bool try_to_unlazy(struct nameidata *nd)
BUG_ON(!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU));
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_RCU;
- if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CACHED)
- goto out1;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_links(nd)))
goto out1;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_path(nd, &nd->path, nd->seq)))
@@ -724,8 +727,6 @@ static bool try_to_unlazy_next(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry, unsi
BUG_ON(!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU));
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_RCU;
- if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CACHED)
- goto out2;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_links(nd)))
goto out2;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->m_seq)))
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-01 18:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <[email protected]>
2021-04-01 15:45 ` [syzbot] WARNING in mntput_no_expire (2) Christian Brauner
2021-04-01 16:09 ` Jens Axboe
2021-04-01 17:46 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-01 17:59 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2021-04-01 19:11 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 2:34 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 2:38 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 11:34 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-04 15:56 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 16:40 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-04 16:44 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 17:05 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-04 18:50 ` Al Viro
2021-04-04 20:17 ` Al Viro
2021-04-05 11:44 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-05 16:18 ` Al Viro
2021-04-05 17:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-05 18:23 ` Al Viro
2021-04-05 18:28 ` Al Viro
2021-04-05 20:07 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-06 1:38 ` Al Viro
2021-04-06 2:24 ` Al Viro
2021-04-06 12:35 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-06 13:13 ` Al Viro
2021-04-06 13:22 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-06 14:15 ` Al Viro
2021-04-06 14:23 ` Al Viro
2021-04-06 15:37 ` Jens Axboe
2021-04-06 14:46 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-04 16:52 ` Christian Brauner
2021-04-04 16:55 ` Christian Brauner
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