From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6EBB3C4320A for ; Thu, 26 Aug 2021 01:16:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F326610A1 for ; Thu, 26 Aug 2021 01:16:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235809AbhHZBRo (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:17:44 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([216.205.24.124]:47070 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235677AbhHZBRn (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:17:43 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1629940615; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=xGZ4blQfD1SQzAW+8oNrI9+DDA2xYpM8Bz8tQolg2hE=; b=U3aTaaVCJvn7O7eAjU52TUDn2HKjQWVlIFtYg0r1848/p5Fw/Xzk1bpdpnKLblwjHCHSOA 0LNmvjzmBZQnm3fwxiE86q+MK6+sLyPCweOUp5ULal2LlYXeYa+Rmr7BLEvFDE5GQFFgTQ Ee+eezqkoe75XXgx6lephzF1y7EmZss= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-541-Olw_4qIKPzy6iyhZV81APw-1; Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:16:54 -0400 X-MC-Unique: Olw_4qIKPzy6iyhZV81APw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BB9BA8015C7; Thu, 26 Aug 2021 01:16:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from madcap2.tricolour.ca (unknown [10.3.128.14]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B16060843; Thu, 26 Aug 2021 01:16:41 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2021 21:16:39 -0400 From: Richard Guy Briggs To: Paul Moore Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi , Jens Axboe , Pavel Begunkov Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Message-ID: <20210826011639.GE490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca> References: <162871480969.63873.9434591871437326374.stgit@olly> <20210824205724.GB490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210824205724.GB490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: io-uring@vger.kernel.org On 2021-08-24 16:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2021-08-11 16:48, Paul Moore wrote: > > Draft #2 of the patchset which brings auditing and proper LSM access > > controls to the io_uring subsystem. The original patchset was posted > > in late May and can be found via lore using the link below: > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/162163367115.8379.8459012634106035341.stgit@sifl/ > > > > This draft should incorporate all of the feedback from the original > > posting as well as a few smaller things I noticed while playing > > further with the code. The big change is of course the selective > > auditing in the io_uring op servicing, but that has already been > > discussed quite a bit in the original thread so I won't go into > > detail here; the important part is that we found a way to move > > forward and this draft captures that. For those of you looking to > > play with these patches, they are based on Linus' v5.14-rc5 tag and > > on my test system they boot and appear to function without problem; > > they pass the selinux-testsuite and audit-testsuite and I have not > > noticed any regressions in the normal use of the system. If you want > > to get a copy of these patches straight from git you can use the > > "working-io_uring" branch in the repo below: > > > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git > > > > Beyond the existing test suite tests mentioned above, I've cobbled > > together some very basic, very crude tests to exercise some of the > > things I care about from a LSM/audit perspective. These tests are > > pretty awful (I'm not kidding), but they might be helpful for the > > other LSM/audit developers who want to test things: > > > > https://drop.paul-moore.com/90.kUgq > > > > There are currently two tests: 'iouring.2' and 'iouring.3'; > > 'iouring.1' was lost in a misguided and overzealous 'rm' command. > > The first test is standalone and basically tests the SQPOLL > > functionality while the second tests sharing io_urings across process > > boundaries and the credential/personality sharing mechanism. The > > console output of both tests isn't particularly useful, the more > > interesting bits are in the audit and LSM specific logs. The > > 'iouring.2' command requires no special arguments to run but the > > 'iouring.3' test is split into a "server" and "client"; the server > > should be run without argument: > > > > % ./iouring.3s > > >>> server started, pid = 11678 > > >>> memfd created, fd = 3 > > >>> io_uring created; fd = 5, creds = 1 > > > > ... while the client should be run with two arguments: the first is > > the PID of the server process, the second is the "memfd" fd number: > > > > % ./iouring.3c 11678 3 > > >>> client started, server_pid = 11678 server_memfd = 3 > > >>> io_urings = 5 (server) / 5 (client) > > >>> io_uring ops using creds = 1 > > >>> async op result: 36 > > >>> async op result: 36 > > >>> async op result: 36 > > >>> async op result: 36 > > >>> START file contents > > What is this life if, full of care, > > we have no time to stand and stare. > > >>> END file contents > > > > The tests were hacked together from various sources online, > > attribution and links to additional info can be found in the test > > sources, but I expect these tests to die a fiery death in the not > > to distant future as I work to add some proper tests to the SELinux > > and audit test suites. > > > > As I believe these patches should spend a full -rcX cycle in > > linux-next, my current plan is to continue to solicit feedback on > > these patches while they undergo additional testing (next up is > > verification of the audit filter code for io_uring). Assuming no > > critical issues are found on the mailing lists or during testing, I > > will post a proper patchset later with the idea of merging it into > > selinux/next after the upcoming merge window closes. > > > > Any comments, feedback, etc. are welcome. > > Thanks for the tests. I have a bunch of userspace patches to add to the > last set I posted and these tests will help exercise them. I also have > one more kernel patch to post... I'll dive back into that now. I had > wanted to post them before now but got distracted with AUDIT_TRIM > breakage. Please tell me about liburing.h that is needed for these. There is one in tools/io_uring/liburing.h but I don't think that one is right. The next obvious one would be include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h I must be missing something obvious here... > > --- > > > > Casey Schaufler (1): > > Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug > > > > Paul Moore (8): > > audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond > > syscalls > > audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring > > audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing > > audit: add filtering for io_uring records > > fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to > > anon_inode_getfd_secure() > > io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface > > lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring > > selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls > > > > > > fs/anon_inodes.c | 29 ++ > > fs/io-wq.c | 4 + > > fs/io_uring.c | 69 +++- > > include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 4 + > > include/linux/audit.h | 26 ++ > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 + > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 + > > include/linux/security.h | 16 + > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 4 +- > > kernel/audit.h | 7 +- > > kernel/audit_tree.c | 3 +- > > kernel/audit_watch.c | 3 +- > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 15 +- > > kernel/auditsc.c | 483 +++++++++++++++++++----- > > security/security.c | 12 + > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++ > > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++ > > 18 files changed, 678 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-) > > > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635