From: Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>
To: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>,
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>,
Paul Moore <[email protected]>,
James Morris <[email protected]>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>,
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>,
Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Subject: [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 15:57:51 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
This patchset provides the changes required for controlling access to
the io_uring_setup system call by LSMs. It does this by adding a new
hook to io_uring. It also provides the SELinux implementation for a new
permission, io_uring { setup }, using the new hook.
This is important because existing io_uring hooks only support limiting
the sharing of credentials and access to the sensitive uring_cmd file
op. Users of LSMs may also want the ability to tightly control which
callers can retrieve an io_uring capable fd from the kernel, which is
needed for all subsequent io_uring operations.
This was tested by running the liburing test suite on a kernel
containing these patches.
Gil Cukierman (2):
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hook for io_uring_setup
selinux: add support for the io_uring setup permission
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 4 ++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.38.0.135.g90850a2211-goog
next reply other threads:[~2022-11-07 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-07 20:57 Gil Cukierman [this message]
2022-11-07 20:57 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hook for io_uring_setup Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 21:13 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls " Paul Moore
2022-11-10 17:54 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2022-11-10 21:04 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <CGME20221114143147eucas1p1902d9b4afc377fdda25910a5d083e3dc@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2022-11-14 14:31 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-15 5:39 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2023-08-08 20:40 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 0:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 11:21 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 14:49 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 17:28 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 9:08 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 12:27 ` Stephen Smalley
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