From: Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>
To: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>,
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>,
Paul Moore <[email protected]>,
James Morris <[email protected]>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
Cc: Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hook for io_uring_setup
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 15:57:52 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
This patch allows LSMs to apply security policies that control
access to the io_uring_setup syscall. This is accomplished by
adding a new hook:
int security_uring_setup(void)
Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup.
This hook, together with the existing hooks for sharing of file
descriptors and io_uring credentials, allow LSMs to expose
comprehensive controls on the usage of io_uring overall.
Signed-off-by: Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 4 ++++
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..ffbf29b32a48 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -409,4 +409,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_setup, void)
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 4ec80b96c22e..bc13a8e664c9 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1589,6 +1589,9 @@
* @uring_cmd:
* Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run.
*
+ * @uring_setup:
+ * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup.
+ *
*/
union security_list_options {
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..0bba7dd85691 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2069,6 +2069,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
+extern int security_uring_setup(void);
#else
static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
@@ -2082,6 +2083,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_uring_setup(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 6cc16e39b27f..1456c85648ed 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -3574,6 +3574,11 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
{
struct io_uring_params p;
int i;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_uring_setup();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (copy_from_user(&p, params, sizeof(p)))
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..b1bc95df5a5d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2671,4 +2671,8 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
{
return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
}
+int security_uring_setup(void)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_setup, 0);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
--
2.38.0.135.g90850a2211-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-07 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-07 20:57 [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 20:57 ` Gil Cukierman [this message]
2022-11-07 21:13 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-10 17:54 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2022-11-10 21:04 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <CGME20221114143147eucas1p1902d9b4afc377fdda25910a5d083e3dc@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2022-11-14 14:31 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-15 5:39 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2023-08-08 20:40 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 0:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 11:21 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 14:49 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 17:28 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 9:08 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 12:27 ` Stephen Smalley
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