From: Joel Granados <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>,
<[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>,
<[email protected]>, <[email protected]>,
Joel Granados <[email protected]>
Subject: [RFC v2 1/1] Use a fs callback to set security specific data
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 11:31:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <[email protected]>
---
drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 10 ++++++++++
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++--
io_uring/uring_cmd.c | 3 ++-
security/security.c | 5 +++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
index f94b05c585cb..275826fe3c9e 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 2011-2014, Intel Corporation.
*/
+#include "linux/security.h"
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/blk-mq.h>
#include <linux/blk-integrity.h>
@@ -3308,6 +3309,13 @@ static int nvme_dev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+int nvme_uring_cmd_sec(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, struct security_uring_cmd *sec)
+{
+ sec->flags = 0;
+ sec->flags = SECURITY_URING_CMD_TYPE_IOCTL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static const struct file_operations nvme_dev_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.open = nvme_dev_open,
@@ -3315,6 +3323,7 @@ static const struct file_operations nvme_dev_fops = {
.unlocked_ioctl = nvme_dev_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.uring_cmd = nvme_dev_uring_cmd,
+ .uring_cmd_sec = nvme_uring_cmd_sec,
};
static ssize_t nvme_sysfs_reset(struct device *dev,
@@ -3982,6 +3991,7 @@ static const struct file_operations nvme_ns_chr_fops = {
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.uring_cmd = nvme_ns_chr_uring_cmd,
.uring_cmd_iopoll = nvme_ns_chr_uring_cmd_iopoll,
+ .uring_cmd_sec = nvme_uring_cmd_sec,
};
static int nvme_add_ns_cdev(struct nvme_ns *ns)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index e654435f1651..af743a2dd562 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2091,6 +2091,7 @@ struct dir_context {
struct iov_iter;
struct io_uring_cmd;
+struct security_uring_cmd;
struct file_operations {
struct module *owner;
@@ -2136,6 +2137,7 @@ struct file_operations {
int (*uring_cmd)(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, unsigned int issue_flags);
int (*uring_cmd_iopoll)(struct io_uring_cmd *, struct io_comp_batch *,
unsigned int poll_flags);
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, struct security_uring_cmd*);
} __randomize_layout;
struct inode_operations {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..6cef29bce373 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -408,5 +408,6 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd,
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, struct security_uring_cmd*))
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..146b1bbdc2e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2065,10 +2065,20 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+enum security_uring_cmd_type
+{
+ SECURITY_URING_CMD_TYPE_IOCTL,
+};
+
+struct security_uring_cmd {
+ u64 flags;
+};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
-extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
+extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd,
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *,
+ struct security_uring_cmd*));
#else
static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
@@ -2078,7 +2088,9 @@ static inline int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd,
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *,
+ struct security_uring_cmd*))
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
index e50de0b6b9f8..2f650b346756 100644
--- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
+++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
@@ -108,10 +108,11 @@ int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
struct file *file = req->file;
int ret;
+ //req->file->f_op->owner->ei_funcs
if (!req->file->f_op->uring_cmd)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- ret = security_uring_cmd(ioucmd);
+ ret = security_uring_cmd(ioucmd, req->file->f_op->uring_cmd_sec);
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..d3360a32f971 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2667,8 +2667,9 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
}
-int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd,
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, struct security_uring_cmd*))
{
- return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
+ return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd, uring_cmd_sec);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f553c370397e..9fe3a230c671 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
*/
+#include "linux/nvme_ioctl.h"
+#include "linux/security.h"
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -6999,18 +7001,30 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
* IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
*
*/
-static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd,
+ int (*uring_cmd_sec)(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd, struct security_uring_cmd*))
{
struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct security_uring_cmd sec_uring = {0};
+ int ret;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
ad.u.file = file;
+ ret = uring_cmd_sec(ioucmd, &sec_uring);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (sec_uring.flags & SECURITY_URING_CMD_TYPE_IOCTL)
+ return ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) ioucmd->cmd_op);
+
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-22 10:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <CGME20221122103536eucas1p2a0bc5ebdf063715f063e5b6254d0b058@eucas1p2.samsung.com>
2022-11-22 10:31 ` [RFC v2 0/1] RFC on how to include LSM hooks for io_uring commands Joel Granados
[not found] ` <CGME20221122103536eucas1p28f1c88f2300e49942c789721fe70c428@eucas1p2.samsung.com>
2022-11-22 10:31 ` Joel Granados [this message]
2022-11-22 15:18 ` [RFC v2 1/1] Use a fs callback to set security specific data Casey Schaufler
2022-11-28 8:19 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-28 9:06 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-23 21:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-28 9:27 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-29 14:24 ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-30 21:29 ` Joel Granados
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