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From: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected]
Cc: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 13:27:10 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)

Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in
io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain
control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables
the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.

The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud
providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring
where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For
example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by
default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that
requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the
machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring
a kernel recompilation or a reboot.

[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring

---
v2:
	* Documentation style fixes
	* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged
	  processes


Matteo Rizzo (1):
  Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                         | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)

-- 
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2023-06-29 13:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-29 13:27 Matteo Rizzo [this message]
2023-06-29 13:27 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-29 15:15   ` Bart Van Assche
2023-06-29 15:28     ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-29 17:37       ` Bart Van Assche
2023-06-29 16:17   ` Jeff Moyer
2023-06-29 18:36   ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2023-06-30 15:04     ` Matteo Rizzo

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