From: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Cc: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2023 15:10:03 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1,
or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring
instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to
io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM
regardless of privilege.
Signed-off-by: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
io_uring/io_uring.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index 3800fab1619b..ee65f7aeb0cf 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the
``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded.
+io_uring_disabled
+=================
+
+Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this
+shrinks the kernel's attack surface.
+
+= ==================================================================
+0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the
+ default setting.
+1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes.
+ io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is
+ privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can
+ still be used.
+2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup
+ always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be
+ used.
+= ==================================================================
+
+
kexec_load_disabled
===================
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index e8096d502a7c..5410f5576980 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -152,6 +152,22 @@ static void __io_submit_flush_completions(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);
struct kmem_cache *req_cachep;
+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "io_uring_disabled",
+ .data = &sysctl_io_uring_disabled,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_io_uring_disabled),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
+ },
+ {},
+};
+#endif
+
struct sock *io_uring_get_socket(struct file *file)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_UNIX)
@@ -4015,9 +4031,19 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
}
+static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+ int disabled = READ_ONCE(sysctl_io_uring_disabled);
+
+ return disabled == 0 || (disabled == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN));
+}
+
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
struct io_uring_params __user *, params)
{
+ if (!io_uring_allowed())
+ return -EPERM;
+
return io_uring_setup(entries, params);
}
@@ -4592,6 +4618,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void)
req_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(io_kiocb, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ register_sysctl_init("kernel", kernel_io_uring_disabled_table);
+#endif
+
return 0;
};
__initcall(io_uring_init);
--
2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-30 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-30 15:10 [PATCH v3 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-30 15:10 ` Matteo Rizzo [this message]
2023-06-30 15:15 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add " Jann Horn
2023-07-26 17:45 ` Andres Freund
2023-07-26 20:02 ` Jeff Moyer
2023-08-09 15:09 ` Andres Freund
2023-08-09 16:45 ` Jens Axboe
2023-08-09 18:38 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2023-07-11 20:51 ` [PATCH v3 0/1] Add " Jens Axboe
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