Re: IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL and audit/LSM interactions

[Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>]

On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at 11:33:37AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> Hello all,
> 
> I just noticed the recent addition of IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL and I
> see that it is currently written to skip the io_uring auditing.
> Assuming I'm understanding the patch correctly, and I'll admit that
> I've only looked at it for a short time today, my gut feeling is that
> we want to audit the FIXED_FD_INSTALL opcode as it could make a
> previously io_uring-only fd generally accessible to userspace.
> 
> I'm also trying to determine how worried we should be about
> io_install_fixed_fd() potentially happening with the current task's
> credentials overridden by the io_uring's personality.  Given that this
> io_uring operation inserts a fd into the current process, I believe
> that we should be checking to see if the current task's credentials,
> and not the io_uring's credentials/personality, are allowed to receive
> the fd in receive_fd()/security_file_receive().  I don't see an
> obvious way to filter/block credential overrides on a per-opcode
> basis, but if we don't want to add a mask for io_kiocb::flags in
> io_issue_defs (or something similar), perhaps we can forcibly mask out
> REQ_F_CREDS in io_install_fixed_fd_prep()?  I'm very interested to
> hear what others think about this.

Right, completely forgot about the creds support in io_uring. Just
disallow this together with FIXED_FD_INSTALL. That's also the gist of
the rest of this thread iiuc.