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From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:55:02 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)

We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
command to take into account the security implications of making an
io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace
task.

The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL
operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor
table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users
may want to audit.

The second change is to disable the io_uring credential override
functionality, also known as io_uring "personalities", in the
FD_INSTALL command.  The credential override in FD_INSTALL is
particularly problematic as it affects the credentials used in the
security_file_receive() LSM hook.  If a task were to request a
credential override via REQ_F_CREDS on a FD_INSTALL operation, the LSM
would incorrectly check to see if the overridden credentials of the
io_uring were able to "receive" the file as opposed to the task's
credentials.  After discussions upstream, it's difficult to imagine a
use case where we would want to allow a credential override on a
FD_INSTALL operation so we are simply going to block REQ_F_CREDS on
IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operations.

Fixes: dc18b89ab113 ("io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
---
 io_uring/opdef.c     | 1 -
 io_uring/openclose.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/io_uring/opdef.c b/io_uring/opdef.c
index 6705634e5f52..b1ee3a9c3807 100644
--- a/io_uring/opdef.c
+++ b/io_uring/opdef.c
@@ -471,7 +471,6 @@ const struct io_issue_def io_issue_defs[] = {
 	},
 	[IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL] = {
 		.needs_file		= 1,
-		.audit_skip		= 1,
 		.prep			= io_install_fixed_fd_prep,
 		.issue			= io_install_fixed_fd,
 	},
diff --git a/io_uring/openclose.c b/io_uring/openclose.c
index 0fe0dd305546..e3357dfa14ca 100644
--- a/io_uring/openclose.c
+++ b/io_uring/openclose.c
@@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sq
 	if (flags & ~IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* ensure the task's creds are used when installing/receiving fds */
+	if (req->flags & REQ_F_CREDS)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* default to O_CLOEXEC, disable if IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC is set */
 	ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
 	ifi->o_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
-- 
2.43.0


             reply	other threads:[~2024-01-23 21:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-23 21:55 Paul Moore [this message]
2024-01-23 21:57 ` [PATCH] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL Paul Moore
2024-01-23 22:12   ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:35 ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:40   ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:43     ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 23:58       ` Paul Moore

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