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From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
To: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected],
	[email protected],
	[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH] epoll: try to be a _bit_ better about file lifetimes
Date: Sun, 5 May 2024 20:46:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240505194603.GH2118490@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whrSSNYVzTHNFDNGag_xcKuv=RaQUX8+n29kkic39DRuQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, May 04, 2024 at 08:53:47AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:

>   poll_wait
>     -> __pollwait
>      -> get_file (*boom*)
> 
> but the boom is very small because the poll_wait() will be undone by
> poll_freewait(), and normally poll/select has held the file count
> elevated.

Not quite.  It's not that poll_wait() calls __pollwait(); it calls
whatever callback that caller of ->poll() has set for it.

__pollwait users (select(2) and poll(2), currently) must (and do) make
sure that refcount is elevated; others (and epoll is not the only one)
need to do whatever's right for their callbacks.

I've no problem with having epoll grab a reference, but if we make that
a universal requirement ->poll() instances can rely upon, we'd better
verify that *all* vfs_poll() are OK.  And that ought to go into
Documentation/filesystems/porting.rst ("callers of vfs_poll() must
make sure that file is pinned; ->poll() instances may rely upon that,
but they'd better be very careful about grabbing extra references themselves -
it's acceptable for files on internal mounts, but *NOT* for anything on
mountable filesystems.  Any instance that does it needs an explicit
comment telling not to reuse that blindly." or something along those
lines).

Excluding epoll, select/poll and callers that have just done fdget() and will
do fdput() after vfs_poll(), we have this:

drivers/vhost/vhost.c:213:      mask = vfs_poll(file, &poll->table);
	vhost_poll_start().  Might get interesting...  Calls working
with vq->kick as file seem to rely upon vq->mutex, but I'll need to
refresh my memories of that code to check if that's all we need - and
then there's vhost_net_enable_vq(), which also needs an audit.

fs/aio.c:1738:          mask = vfs_poll(req->file, &pt) & req->events;
fs/aio.c:1932:  mask = vfs_poll(req->file, &apt.pt) & req->events;
	aio_poll() and aio_poll_wake() resp.  req->file here is actually ->ki_filp
	of iocb that contains work as iocb->req.work; it get dropped only in
	iocb_destroy(), which also frees iocb.  Any call that might've run into
	req->file not pinned is already in UAF land.

io_uring/poll.c:303:                    req->cqe.res = vfs_poll(req->file, &pt) & req->apoll_events;
io_uring/poll.c:622:    mask = vfs_poll(req->file, &ipt->pt) & poll->events;
	Should have req->file pinned, but I'll need to RTFS a bit for
details.  That, or ask Jens to confirm...

net/9p/trans_fd.c:236:  ret = vfs_poll(ts->rd, pt);
net/9p/trans_fd.c:238:          ret = (ret & ~EPOLLOUT) | (vfs_poll(ts->wr, pt) & ~EPOLLIN);
	p9_fd_poll(); ->rd and ->wr are pinned and won't get dropped until
p9_fd_close(), which frees ts immediately afterwards.  IOW, if we risk
being called with ->rd or ->wr not pinned, we are in UAF land already.
Incidentally, what the hell is this in p9_fd_open()?
         * It's technically possible for userspace or concurrent mounts to
         * modify this flag concurrently, which will likely result in a
         * broken filesystem. However, just having bad flags here should
         * not crash the kernel or cause any other sort of bug, so mark this
         * particular data race as intentional so that tooling (like KCSAN)
         * can allow it and detect further problems.
         */
Why not simply fix the race instead?  As in
	spin_lock(&ts->rd->f_lock);
        ts->rd->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
	spin_unlock(&ts->rd->f_lock);
and similar for ts->wr?  Sigh...

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-05 19:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-08  8:26 [syzbot] [fs?] [io-uring?] general protection fault in __ep_remove syzbot
2024-04-15 14:31 ` Jens Axboe
2024-04-15 14:57   ` Pavel Begunkov
2024-05-03 11:54 ` Bui Quang Minh
2024-05-03 18:26   ` get_file() unsafe under epoll (was Re: [syzbot] [fs?] [io-uring?] general protection fault in __ep_remove) Kees Cook
2024-05-03 18:49     ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-03 19:22       ` Kees Cook
2024-05-03 19:35         ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-03 19:59           ` Kees Cook
2024-05-03 20:28             ` Kees Cook
2024-05-03 21:11               ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 21:24                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 21:30                   ` Al Viro
2024-05-06 17:46                   ` Stefan Metzmacher
2024-05-06 18:17                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-08  8:47                       ` David Laight
2024-05-03 21:36                 ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 21:42                   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 21:53                     ` Al Viro
2024-05-06 12:23                       ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-04  9:59             ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-03 21:11     ` [PATCH] epoll: try to be a _bit_ better about file lifetimes Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 21:24       ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 21:33         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 21:45           ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 21:52             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 22:01               ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 22:07                 ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 23:16                   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-03 23:39                     ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 23:54                       ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-04 10:44                       ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-03 22:46               ` Kees Cook
2024-05-03 23:03                 ` Al Viro
2024-05-03 23:23                   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-03 23:41                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-04  9:19                       ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-06 12:37                       ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-04  9:37           ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-04 15:32             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-04 15:40               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-04 15:53                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-05 19:46                   ` Al Viro [this message]
2024-05-05 20:03                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-05 20:30                       ` Al Viro
2024-05-05 20:53                         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-06 12:47                           ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-06 14:46                             ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-07 10:58                               ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-06 16:15                           ` Christian König
2024-05-05 10:50                 ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-05 16:46                   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-05 17:55                     ` [PATCH v2] epoll: be " Linus Torvalds
2024-05-05 18:04                       ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-05 20:01                       ` David Laight
2024-05-05 20:16                         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-05 20:12                     ` [PATCH] epoll: try to be a _bit_ " Al Viro
2024-05-06  8:45                     ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-06  9:26                       ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-06 14:19                         ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-07 21:02                       ` David Laight
2024-05-04 18:20               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-06 14:29                 ` [Linaro-mm-sig] " Christian König
2024-05-07 11:02                   ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-07 16:46                     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-07 17:45                       ` Christian König
2024-05-08  7:51                         ` Michel Dänzer
2024-05-08  7:59                           ` Christian König
2024-05-08  8:23                         ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-08  9:10                           ` Christian König
2024-05-07 18:04                       ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-07 19:07                         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-08  5:55                           ` Christian König
2024-05-08  8:32                             ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-08 10:16                               ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-08  8:05                           ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-08 16:19                           ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-08 17:14                             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-09 11:38                               ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-09 15:48                                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-10  6:33                                   ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-08 10:08                   ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-08 15:45                     ` Daniel Vetter
2024-05-10 10:55                       ` Christian Brauner
2024-05-11 18:25                         ` David Laight
2024-05-05 17:31       ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-04  9:45     ` get_file() unsafe under epoll (was Re: [syzbot] [fs?] [io-uring?] general protection fault in __ep_remove) Christian Brauner

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