From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
To: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric Biederman" <[email protected]>,
"Alexander Viro" <[email protected]>,
"Christian Brauner" <[email protected]>,
"Jan Kara" <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
"Ingo Molnar" <[email protected]>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <[email protected]>,
"Juri Lelli" <[email protected]>,
"Vincent Guittot" <[email protected]>,
"Dietmar Eggemann" <[email protected]>,
"Steven Rostedt" <[email protected]>,
"Ben Segall" <[email protected]>, "Mel Gorman" <[email protected]>,
"Valentin Schneider" <[email protected]>,
"Jens Axboe" <[email protected]>,
"Pavel Begunkov" <[email protected]>,
"Andrew Morton" <[email protected]>,
"Chen Yu" <[email protected]>,
"Shuah Khan" <[email protected]>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2024 13:05:18 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202411301244.381F2B8D17@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjAmu9OBS--RwB+HQn4nhUku=7ECOnSRP8JG0oRU97-kA@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Nov 29, 2024 at 11:15:44PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> Edited down to just the end result:
>
> On Fri, 29 Nov 2024 at 20:49, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec)
> > {
> > size_t len = min(strlen(buf), sizeof(tsk->comm) - 1);
> >
> > trace_task_rename(tsk, buf);
> > memcpy(tsk->comm, buf, len);
> > memset(&tsk->comm[len], 0, sizeof(tsk->comm) - len);
> > perf_event_comm(tsk, exec);
> > }
>
> I actually don't think that's super-safe either. Yeah, it works in
> practice, and the last byte is certainly always going to be 0, but it
> might not be reliably padded.
Right, my concern over comm is strictly about unterminated reads (i.e.
exposing memory contents stored after "comm" in the task_struct). I've not
been worried about "uninitialized content" exposure because the starting
contents have always been wiped and will (now) always end with a NUL,
so the worst exposure is seeing prior or racing bytes of whatever is
being written into comm concurrently.
> Why? It walks over the source twice. First at strlen() time, then at
> memcpy. So if the source isn't stable, the end result might have odd
> results with NUL characters in the middle.
Yeah, this just means it has greater potential to be garbled.
> And strscpy() really was *supposed* to be safe even in this case, and
> I thought it was until I looked closer.
>
> But I think strscpy() can be saved.
Yeah, fixing the final NUL byte write is needed.
> Something (UNTESTED!) like the attached I think does the right thing.
> I added a couple of "READ_ONCE()" things to make it really super-clear
> that strscpy() reads the source exactly once, and to not allow any
> compiler re-materialization of the reads (although I think that when I
> asked people, it turns out neither gcc nor clang rematerialize memory
> accesses, so that READ_ONCE is likely more a documentation ad
> theoretical thing than a real thing).
This is fine, but it doesn't solve either an unstable source nor
concurrent writers to dest. If source changes out from under strscpy,
we can still copy a "torn" write. If destination changes out from under
strscpy, we just get a potentially interleaved output (but with the
NUL-write change, we never have a dest that _lacks_ a NUL terminator).
So yeah, let's change the loop as you have it. I'm fine with the
READ_ONCE() additions, but I'm not clear on what benefit it has.
> Hmm? I don't think your version is wrong, but I also think we'd be
> better off making our 'strscpy()' infrastructure explicitly safe wrt
> unstable source strings.
Agreed. I'll get this tested against our string handling selftests...
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-30 21:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-30 4:49 [PATCH] exec: Make sure task->comm is always NUL-terminated Kees Cook
2024-11-30 7:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-30 21:05 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-11-30 21:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-12-01 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-11-30 21:40 ` David Laight
2024-12-01 21:49 ` Jens Axboe
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