From: Dmytro Maluka <[email protected]>
To: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <[email protected]>,
Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>, Jens Axboe <[email protected]>,
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>,
James Morris <[email protected]>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>,
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>,
Eric Paris <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], Joel Granados <[email protected]>,
Jeff Xu <[email protected]>, Takaya Saeki <[email protected]>,
Tomasz Nowicki <[email protected]>,
Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>,
Andres Freund <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 11:08:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
On 8/9/23 19:28, Dmytro Maluka wrote:
> So one of the questions I'm wondering about is: if Android implemented
> preventing execution of any io_uring code by non-trusted processes
> (via seccomp or any other way), how much would it help to reduce the
> risk of attacks, compared to its current SELinux based solution?
And why exactly I'm wondering about that: AFAICT, Android folks are
concerned about the high likelihood of vulnerabilities in io_uring code
just like we (ChromeOS folks) are, and that is the main reason why
Android takes care of restricting io_uring usage in the first place.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-10 9:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-07 20:57 [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 20:57 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hook " Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 21:13 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls " Paul Moore
2022-11-10 17:54 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2022-11-10 21:04 ` Paul Moore
[not found] ` <CGME20221114143147eucas1p1902d9b4afc377fdda25910a5d083e3dc@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2022-11-14 14:31 ` Joel Granados
2022-11-15 5:39 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2023-08-08 20:40 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 0:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 11:21 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 14:49 ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 17:28 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 9:08 ` Dmytro Maluka [this message]
2023-08-10 12:27 ` Stephen Smalley
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
[email protected] \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox