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From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
To: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 14:10:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]> (Jeff Moyer's message of "Wed, 16 Aug 2023 13:55:51 -0400")

Jeff Moyer <[email protected]> writes:

> From: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
>
> Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or
> 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring
> instances, which is the current behavior.  When 1, io_uring creation is
> disabled (io_uring_setup() will fail with -EPERM) for processes not in
> the kernel.io_uring_group group.  When 2, calls to io_uring_setup() fail
> with -EPERM regardless of privilege.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
> [JEM: modified to add io_uring_group]
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
>
> ---
> v4:
>
> * Add a kernel.io_uring_group sysctl to hold a group id that is allowed
>   to use io_uring.  One thing worth pointing out is that, when a group
>   is specified, only users in that group can create an io_uring.  That
>   means that if the root user is not in that group, root can not make
>   use of io_uring.

Rejecting root if it's not in the group doesn't make much sense to
me. Of course, root can always just add itself to the group, so it is
not a security feature. But I'd expect 'sudo <smth>' to not start giving
EPERM based on user group settings.  Can you make CAP_SYS_ADMIN
always allowed for option 1?

>   I also wrote unit tests for liburing.  I'll post that as well if there
>   is consensus on this approach.

I'm fine with this approach as it allow me to easily reject non-root users.

-- 
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi

  reply	other threads:[~2023-08-16 18:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-16 17:55 [PATCH v4] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Jeff Moyer
2023-08-16 18:10 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi [this message]
2023-08-16 18:21   ` Jeff Moyer
2023-08-21 12:29 ` Matteo Rizzo

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