From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
To: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 09:50:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]> (Matteo Rizzo's message of "Tue, 27 Jun 2023 12:00:58 +0000")
Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]> writes:
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> index d85d90f5d000..3c53a238332a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> @@ -450,6 +450,20 @@ this allows system administrators to override the
> ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded.
>
>
> +io_uring_disabled
> +=========================
> +
> +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this
> +shrinks the kernel's attack surface.
> +
> += =============================================================
> +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the default
> + setting.
> +1 io_uring is disabled. io_uring_setup always fails with -EPERM. Existing
> + io_uring instances can still be used.
> += =============================================================
I had an internal request for something like this recently. If we go
this route, we could use a intermediary option that limits io_uring
to root processes only.
--
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-28 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-27 12:00 [PATCH 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-27 12:00 ` [PATCH 1/1] Add a new " Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-27 16:23 ` Randy Dunlap
2023-06-27 17:10 ` Bart Van Assche
2023-06-27 18:15 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-28 11:36 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2023-06-28 15:12 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Jeff Moyer
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2023-06-28 13:50 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi [this message]
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Jeff Moyer
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