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* [PATCH] io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_uring_poll
@ 2021-02-02 19:52 Hao Xu
  2021-02-03  0:04 ` Pavel Begunkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Hao Xu @ 2021-02-02 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jens Axboe; +Cc: io-uring, Pavel Begunkov, Joseph Qi

Abaci reported follow issue:

[   30.615891] ======================================================
[   30.616648] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   30.617423] 5.11.0-rc3-next-20210115 #1 Not tainted
[   30.618035] ------------------------------------------------------
[   30.618914] a.out/1128 is trying to acquire lock:
[   30.619520] ffff88810b063868 (&ep->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.620505]
[   30.620505] but task is already holding lock:
[   30.621218] ffff88810e952be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0
[   30.622349]
[   30.622349] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   30.622349]
[   30.623289]
[   30.623289] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   30.624243]
[   30.624243] -> #1 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   30.625263]        lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390
[   30.625868]        __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0
[   30.626451]        io_cqring_overflow_flush.part.95+0x6d/0x70
[   30.627278]        io_uring_poll+0xcb/0xd0
[   30.627890]        ep_item_poll.isra.14+0x4e/0x90
[   30.628531]        do_epoll_ctl+0xb7e/0x1120
[   30.629122]        __x64_sys_epoll_ctl+0x70/0xb0
[   30.629770]        do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[   30.630332]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   30.631187]
[   30.631187] -> #0 (&ep->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   30.631985]        check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00
[   30.632584]        __lock_acquire+0x1237/0x13a0
[   30.633207]        lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390
[   30.633740]        __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0
[   30.634258]        __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.634879]        __io_arm_poll_handler+0xbf/0x220
[   30.635462]        io_issue_sqe+0xa6b/0x13e0
[   30.635982]        __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550
[   30.636648]        io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470
[   30.637281]        io_submit_sqes+0xcce/0xf10
[   30.637839]        __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3fb/0x5b0
[   30.638465]        do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[   30.638999]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   30.639643]
[   30.639643] other info that might help us debug this:
[   30.639643]
[   30.640618]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   30.640618]
[   30.641402]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   30.641938]        ----                    ----
[   30.642664]   lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
[   30.643425]                                lock(&ep->mtx);
[   30.644498]                                lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
[   30.645668]   lock(&ep->mtx);
[   30.646321]
[   30.646321]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   30.646321]
[   30.647642] 1 lock held by a.out/1128:
[   30.648424]  #0: ffff88810e952be8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3f0/0x5b0
[   30.649954]
[   30.649954] stack backtrace:
[   30.650592] CPU: 1 PID: 1128 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.11.0-rc3-next-20210115 #1
[   30.651554] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[   30.652290] Call Trace:
[   30.652688]  dump_stack+0xac/0xe3
[   30.653164]  check_noncircular+0x11e/0x130
[   30.653747]  ? check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00
[   30.654303]  check_prevs_add+0x226/0xb00
[   30.654845]  ? add_lock_to_list.constprop.49+0xac/0x1d0
[   30.655564]  __lock_acquire+0x1237/0x13a0
[   30.656262]  lock_acquire+0x2c7/0x390
[   30.656788]  ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.657379]  ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180
[   30.658014]  __mutex_lock+0xae/0x9f0
[   30.658524]  ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.659112]  ? mark_held_locks+0x5a/0x80
[   30.659648]  ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.660229]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40
[   30.660885]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x46/0x110
[   30.661471]  ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180
[   30.662102]  ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.662696]  __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x9f/0x220
[   30.663273]  ? __ep_eventpoll_poll+0x220/0x220
[   30.663875]  __io_arm_poll_handler+0xbf/0x220
[   30.664463]  io_issue_sqe+0xa6b/0x13e0
[   30.664984]  ? __lock_acquire+0x782/0x13a0
[   30.665544]  ? __io_queue_proc.isra.88+0x180/0x180
[   30.666170]  ? __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550
[   30.666725]  __io_queue_sqe+0x10b/0x550
[   30.667252]  ? __fget_files+0x131/0x260
[   30.667791]  ? io_req_prep+0xd8/0x1090
[   30.668316]  ? io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470
[   30.668868]  io_queue_sqe+0x235/0x470
[   30.669398]  io_submit_sqes+0xcce/0xf10
[   30.669931]  ? xa_load+0xe4/0x1c0
[   30.670425]  __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x3fb/0x5b0
[   30.671051]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x180
[   30.671719]  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x2b/0x80
[   30.672380]  do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[   30.672901]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   30.673503] RIP: 0033:0x7fd89c813239
[   30.673962] Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05  3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 27 ec 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   30.675920] RSP: 002b:00007ffc65a7c628 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
[   30.676791] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd89c813239
[   30.677594] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000014 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   30.678678] RBP: 00007ffc65a7c720 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000003000000
[   30.679492] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400ff0
[   30.680282] R13: 00007ffc65a7c840 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

This might happen if we do epoll_wait on a uring fd while reading/writing
the former epoll fd in a sqe in the former uring instance.
So let's don't flush cqring overflow list when we fail to get the uring
lock. This leads to less accuracy, but is still ok.

Reported-by: Abaci <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6c503150ae33 ("io_uring: patch up IOPOLL overflow_flush sync")
Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <[email protected]>
---

Here I use mutex_trylock() to fix this issue, but this causes loss of
accuracy. I think doing cqring overflow flush in a task work maybe a
better solution. I'm think of this. Any thoughts?

 fs/io_uring.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
index 38c6cbe1ab38..866e45d42ac7 100644
--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -8718,7 +8718,36 @@ static __poll_t io_uring_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 	smp_rmb();
 	if (!io_sqring_full(ctx))
 		mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
-	io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (test_bit(0, &ctx->cq_check_overflow)) {
+		bool should_flush = true;
+		/* iopoll syncs against uring_lock, not completion_lock */
+		if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
+			/*
+			 * avoid ABBA deadlock.
+			 * there could be contention like below:
+			 *      CPU0                    CPU1
+			 *      ----                    ----
+			 * lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+			 *                              lock(&ep->mtx);
+			 *                              lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+			 * lock(&ep->mtx);
+			 *
+			 * this might happen if we do epoll_wait on a uring fd while
+			 * read/write the former epoll fd in a sqe in the former uring
+			 * instance.
+			 * We don't flush cqring overflow list when we fail to get the
+			 * uring lock. This leads to less accuracy, but is still ok.
+			 */
+			should_flush = mutex_trylock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+		}
+		if (should_flush) {
+			__io_cqring_overflow_flush(ctx, false, NULL, NULL);
+			if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL)
+				mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (io_cqring_events(ctx))
 		mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
 
-- 
1.8.3.1


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-02-04 16:55 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-02-02 19:52 [PATCH] io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_uring_poll Hao Xu
2021-02-03  0:04 ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-02-03  1:48   ` Jens Axboe
2021-02-03 16:48     ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-02-04 16:48     ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-02-04 16:54       ` Hao Xu

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