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From: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
To: Dmytro Maluka <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <[email protected]>,
	Gil Cukierman <[email protected]>, Jens Axboe <[email protected]>,
	Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>,
	James Morris <[email protected]>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>,
	Eric Paris <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected], Joel Granados <[email protected]>,
	Jeff Xu <[email protected]>, Takaya Saeki <[email protected]>,
	Tomasz Nowicki <[email protected]>,
	Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>,
	Andres Freund <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup
Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 08:27:55 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAEjxPJ7xiqKAbfX2JhN2NBbWsdgEesE18RG4d81ELyee6bfOkQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>

On Thu, Aug 10, 2023 at 5:08 AM Dmytro Maluka <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 8/9/23 19:28, Dmytro Maluka wrote:
> >   So one of the questions I'm wondering about is: if Android implemented
> >   preventing execution of any io_uring code by non-trusted processes
> >   (via seccomp or any other way), how much would it help to reduce the
> >   risk of attacks, compared to its current SELinux based solution?
>
> And why exactly I'm wondering about that: AFAICT, Android folks are
> concerned about the high likelihood of vulnerabilities in io_uring code
> just like we (ChromeOS folks) are, and that is the main reason why
> Android takes care of restricting io_uring usage in the first place.

I think if you audit the io_uring syscalls and find a code path that
is not already mediated by a LSM hook (potentially at an earlier point
during setup / fd creation) that accesses any shared resource or
performs a privileged action, we would be open to adding a LSM hook to
cover that code path. But you'd have to do the work to identify and
propose such cases.

      reply	other threads:[~2023-08-10 12:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-07 20:57 [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls for io_uring_setup Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 20:57 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hook " Gil Cukierman
2022-11-07 21:13 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Add LSM access controls " Paul Moore
2022-11-10 17:54   ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2022-11-10 21:04     ` Paul Moore
     [not found]       ` <CGME20221114143147eucas1p1902d9b4afc377fdda25910a5d083e3dc@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2022-11-14 14:31         ` Joel Granados
2022-11-15  5:39           ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2023-08-08 20:40       ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09  0:31         ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 11:21           ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-09 14:49             ` Paul Moore
2023-08-09 17:28               ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10  9:08                 ` Dmytro Maluka
2023-08-10 12:27                   ` Stephen Smalley [this message]

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