IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL and audit/LSM interactions

[Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>]

Hello all,

I just noticed the recent addition of IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL and I
see that it is currently written to skip the io_uring auditing.
Assuming I'm understanding the patch correctly, and I'll admit that
I've only looked at it for a short time today, my gut feeling is that
we want to audit the FIXED_FD_INSTALL opcode as it could make a
previously io_uring-only fd generally accessible to userspace.

I'm also trying to determine how worried we should be about
io_install_fixed_fd() potentially happening with the current task's
credentials overridden by the io_uring's personality.  Given that this
io_uring operation inserts a fd into the current process, I believe
that we should be checking to see if the current task's credentials,
and not the io_uring's credentials/personality, are allowed to receive
the fd in receive_fd()/security_file_receive().  I don't see an
obvious way to filter/block credential overrides on a per-opcode
basis, but if we don't want to add a mask for io_kiocb::flags in
io_issue_defs (or something similar), perhaps we can forcibly mask out
REQ_F_CREDS in io_install_fixed_fd_prep()?  I'm very interested to
hear what others think about this.

Of course if I'm reading the commit or misunderstanding the
IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operation, corrections are welcome :)

-- 
paul-moore.com