From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:57:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRMsUkNHpc45H4PVnrGj77RDR_BLR9nN89Nh725ke1ECg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
On Tue, Jan 23, 2024 at 4:55 PM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> We need to correct some aspects of the IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
> command to take into account the security implications of making an
> io_uring-private file descriptor generally accessible to a userspace
> task.
>
> The first change in this patch is to enable auditing of the FD_INSTALL
> operation as installing a file descriptor into a task's file descriptor
> table is a security relevant operation and something that admins/users
> may want to audit.
>
> The second change is to disable the io_uring credential override
> functionality, also known as io_uring "personalities", in the
> FD_INSTALL command. The credential override in FD_INSTALL is
> particularly problematic as it affects the credentials used in the
> security_file_receive() LSM hook. If a task were to request a
> credential override via REQ_F_CREDS on a FD_INSTALL operation, the LSM
> would incorrectly check to see if the overridden credentials of the
> io_uring were able to "receive" the file as opposed to the task's
> credentials. After discussions upstream, it's difficult to imagine a
> use case where we would want to allow a credential override on a
> FD_INSTALL operation so we are simply going to block REQ_F_CREDS on
> IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL operations.
>
> Fixes: dc18b89ab113 ("io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL")
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> ---
> io_uring/opdef.c | 1 -
> io_uring/openclose.c | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Not having an IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL test handy I only did some
basic sanity tests before posting, I would appreciate it if the
io_uring folks could run this through whatever FD_INSTALL tests you
have.
> diff --git a/io_uring/opdef.c b/io_uring/opdef.c
> index 6705634e5f52..b1ee3a9c3807 100644
> --- a/io_uring/opdef.c
> +++ b/io_uring/opdef.c
> @@ -471,7 +471,6 @@ const struct io_issue_def io_issue_defs[] = {
> },
> [IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL] = {
> .needs_file = 1,
> - .audit_skip = 1,
> .prep = io_install_fixed_fd_prep,
> .issue = io_install_fixed_fd,
> },
> diff --git a/io_uring/openclose.c b/io_uring/openclose.c
> index 0fe0dd305546..e3357dfa14ca 100644
> --- a/io_uring/openclose.c
> +++ b/io_uring/openclose.c
> @@ -277,6 +277,10 @@ int io_install_fixed_fd_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sq
> if (flags & ~IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* ensure the task's creds are used when installing/receiving fds */
> + if (req->flags & REQ_F_CREDS)
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> /* default to O_CLOEXEC, disable if IORING_FIXED_FD_NO_CLOEXEC is set */
> ifi = io_kiocb_to_cmd(req, struct io_fixed_install);
> ifi->o_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
> --
> 2.43.0
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-23 21:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-23 21:55 [PATCH] io_uring: enable audit and restrict cred override for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL Paul Moore
2024-01-23 21:57 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-01-23 22:12 ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:35 ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:40 ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 22:43 ` Jens Axboe
2024-01-23 23:58 ` Paul Moore
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