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From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
To: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: "Hamza Mahfooz" <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], "James Morris" <[email protected]>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>,
	"Jens Axboe" <[email protected]>,
	"Pavel Begunkov" <[email protected]>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <[email protected]>,
	"Ondrej Mosnacek" <[email protected]>,
	"Bram Bonné" <[email protected]>,
	"Thiébaud Weksteen" <[email protected]>,
	"Christian Göttsche" <[email protected]>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 12:15:33 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSFH2aYoBqcCcamApHpU=YHbabkQEKriBDBLjP08gYV6A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>

On Tue, Jan 28, 2025 at 7:02 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> I can't say I agree that it's an access control because although it is
> specific to a process it isn't specific to an object. You can still access
> the set of objects using other means. It is a mechanism control, preventing
> use of io_uring entirely.

I see your argument and raise you "capabilities".

Granted, we could have a fairly lively debate about the merits of
capabilities, which I'm not encouraging here, I'm only mentioning it
as a counterpoint and evidence that there is precedent for things like
this as "access control".

> I'm much more concerned about bugs in io_uring than in xyzzy. The io_uring
> people have been pretty good about addressing LSM issues, so it's not
> a huge deal, but I never like seeing switches to turn off features because
> security is active.
>
> If no one else shares my concern you can put my comments down to the
> ravings of the lunatic fringe and ignore them.

Fair enough.  FWIW, I appreciate the discussion, even if we didn't
quite reach consensus this time around.

-- 
paul-moore.com

      reply	other threads:[~2025-01-30 17:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-27 15:57 [PATCH v3 1/2] io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed() Hamza Mahfooz
2025-01-27 15:57 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup() Hamza Mahfooz
2025-01-27 17:18   ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-27 21:23     ` Paul Moore
2025-01-28  0:23       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-28 22:35         ` Paul Moore
2025-01-29  0:02           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-30 17:15             ` Paul Moore [this message]

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