From: Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
To: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2023 20:15:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHKB1wJANtT27WM6hrhDy_x9H9Lsn4qRjPDmXdKosoL93TJRYg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
On Tue, 27 Jun 2023 at 19:10, Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> wrote:
> I'm using fio + io_uring all the time on Android devices. I think we need a
> better solution than disabling io_uring system-wide, e.g. a mechanism based
> on SELinux that disables io_uring for apps and that keeps io_uring enabled
> for processes started via 'adb root && adb shell ...'
Android already uses seccomp to prevent untrusted applications from using
io_uring. This patch is aimed at server/desktop environments where there is
no easy way to set a system-wide seccomp policy and right now the only way
to disable io_uring system-wide is to compile it out of the kernel entirely
(not really feasible for e.g. a general-purpose distro).
I thought about adding a capability check that lets privileged processes
bypass this sysctl, but it wasn't clear to me which capability I should use.
For userfaultfd the kernel uses CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but I wasn't sure that's
the best choice here since io_uring has nothing to do with ptrace.
If anyone has any suggestions please let me know. A LSM hook also sounds
like an option but it would be more complicated to implement and use.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-27 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-27 12:00 [PATCH 0/1] Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-27 12:00 ` [PATCH 1/1] Add a new " Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-27 16:23 ` Randy Dunlap
2023-06-27 17:10 ` Bart Van Assche
2023-06-27 18:15 ` Matteo Rizzo [this message]
2023-06-28 11:36 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2023-06-28 15:12 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Jeff Moyer
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2023-06-28 13:50 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2023-06-28 15:59 ` Jeff Moyer
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