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From: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
To: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Linux-Audit Mailing List <[email protected]>,
	LKML <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], Eric Paris <[email protected]>,
	Steve Grubb <[email protected]>, Stefan Roesch <[email protected]>,
	Christian Brauner <[email protected]>,
	Jens Axboe <[email protected]>,
	Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 18:01:37 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQiy9vP7BdQk+SXG7gQKAqOAqbYtU+c9R0_ym0h4bgG7g@mail.gmail.com>

On 2023-01-27 17:43, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 27, 2023 at 12:24 PM Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Getting XATTRs is not particularly interesting security-wise.
> >
> > Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <[email protected]>
> > Fixes: a56834e0fafe ("io_uring: add fgetxattr and getxattr support")
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
> > ---
> >  io_uring/opdef.c | 2 ++
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> Depending on your security policy, fetching file data, including
> xattrs, can be interesting from a security perspective.  As an
> example, look at the SELinux file/getattr permission.
> 
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-notebook/blob/main/src/object_classes_permissions.md#common-file-permissions

The intent here is to lessen the impact of audit operations.  Read and
Write were explicitly removed from io_uring auditing due to performance
concerns coupled with the denial of service implications from sheer
volume of records making other messages harder to locate.  Those
operations are still possible for syscall auditing but they are strongly
discouraged for normal use.

If the frequency of getxattr io_uring ops is so infrequent as to be no
distraction, then this patch may be more of a liability than a benefit.

> > diff --git a/io_uring/opdef.c b/io_uring/opdef.c
> > index a2bf53b4a38a..f6bfe2cf078c 100644
> > --- a/io_uring/opdef.c
> > +++ b/io_uring/opdef.c
> > @@ -462,12 +462,14 @@ const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
> >         },
> >         [IORING_OP_FGETXATTR] = {
> >                 .needs_file = 1,
> > +               .audit_skip             = 1,
> >                 .name                   = "FGETXATTR",
> >                 .prep                   = io_fgetxattr_prep,
> >                 .issue                  = io_fgetxattr,
> >                 .cleanup                = io_xattr_cleanup,
> >         },
> >         [IORING_OP_GETXATTR] = {
> > +               .audit_skip             = 1,
> >                 .name                   = "GETXATTR",
> >                 .prep                   = io_getxattr_prep,
> >                 .issue                  = io_getxattr,
> > --
> > 2.27.0
> 
> -- 
> paul-moore.com
> 

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <[email protected]>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635


  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-27 23:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-27 17:23 [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] io_uring,audit: audit IORING_OP_FADVISE but not IORING_OP_MADVISE Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 22:35   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 22:45     ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 22:57       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-28 16:48         ` Steve Grubb
2023-01-27 23:02       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 23:03         ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 23:08           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 22:55     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 23:05       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 17:23 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] io_uring,audit: do not log IORING_OP_*GETXATTR Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 22:43   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 23:01     ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2023-01-27 23:05       ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-28  0:07         ` Paul Moore
2023-01-28  0:06       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-28  0:19         ` Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-28 17:26     ` Steve Grubb
2023-01-29 23:37       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 17:40 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] two suggested iouring op audit updates Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 19:42   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 19:43     ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 22:38       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 22:46         ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 22:53           ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 23:02             ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-27 23:07               ` Richard Guy Briggs
2023-01-27 23:08               ` Paul Moore
2023-01-27 23:10                 ` Jens Axboe
2023-01-28 16:47             ` Steve Grubb
2023-01-28 17:03               ` Paul Moore

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