From: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
To: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected], [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to for the new uring_cmd file op
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2022 17:54:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YtC6wT4CYq0an/[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
On Wed, Jul 13, 2022 at 05:38:42PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/13/2022 5:05 PM, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring:
> > add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
> > file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
> > to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
> > passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
> >
> > This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
> > conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
> > operation.
>
> tl;dr - Yuck. Again.
>
> You're passing the complexity of uring-cmd directly into each
> and every security module. SELinux, AppArmor, Smack, BPF and
> every other LSM now needs to know the gory details of everything
> that might be in any arbitrary subsystem so that it can make a
> wild guess about what to do. And I thought ioctl was hard to deal
> with.
Yes... I cannot agree anymore.
> Look at what Paul Moore did for the existing io_uring code.
> Carry that forward into your passthrough implementation.
Which one in particular? I didn't see any glaring obvious answers.
> No, I don't think that waving security away because we haven't
> proposed a fix for your flawed design is acceptable. Sure, we
> can help.
Hey if the answer was obvious it would have been implemented.
Luis
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-15 0:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-14 0:05 [PATCH] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to for the new uring_cmd file op Luis Chamberlain
2022-07-14 0:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 0:54 ` Luis Chamberlain [this message]
2022-07-15 1:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-14 3:00 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-15 1:00 ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-07-15 18:46 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-15 19:02 ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-07-15 19:51 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-15 19:07 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 19:50 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-15 20:00 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 21:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 21:32 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 21:37 ` Luis Chamberlain
2022-07-15 21:47 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 20:50 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 23:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 23:05 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 23:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 23:18 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-15 23:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-15 23:34 ` Jens Axboe
2022-07-16 3:20 ` Kanchan Joshi
2022-07-18 14:55 ` Paul Moore
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