public inbox for [email protected]
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
To: Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]>,
	[email protected]
Cc: "Paul Moore" <[email protected]>,
	"James Morris" <[email protected]>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>,
	"Jens Axboe" <[email protected]>,
	"Pavel Begunkov" <[email protected]>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <[email protected]>,
	"Ondrej Mosnacek" <[email protected]>,
	"Bram Bonné" <[email protected]>,
	"Thiébaud Weksteen" <[email protected]>,
	"Christian Göttsche" <[email protected]>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <[email protected]>,
	[email protected], [email protected],
	[email protected],
	"Casey Schaufler" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 09:18:31 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>

On 1/27/2025 7:57 AM, Hamza Mahfooz wrote:
> It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
> because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
> add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.

I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook
so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely
interacting with LSMs.

>
> Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <[email protected]>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h            |  5 +++++
>  io_uring/io_uring.c                 |  2 +-
>  security/security.c                 | 12 ++++++++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c            | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  2 +-
>  6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index e2f1ce37c41e..9eb313bd0c93 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_allowed, void)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>  
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 980b6c207cad..3e68f8468a22 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -2362,6 +2362,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
>  extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
>  extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
>  extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
> +extern int security_uring_allowed(void);
>  #else
>  static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
>  {
> @@ -2375,6 +2376,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +extern int security_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>  
> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> index c2d8bd4c2cfc..9df7b3b556ef 100644
> --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
> +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> @@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
>  allowed_lsm:
> -	return 0;
> +	return security_uring_allowed();
>  }
>  
>  SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 143561ebc3e8..c9fae447327e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -5999,6 +5999,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>  {
>  	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
>  }
> +
> +/**
> + * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
> + *
> + * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>  
>  /**
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7b867dfec88b..fb37e87df226 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7137,6 +7137,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
>  	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
>  			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
>  }
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
> + *
> + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
> + */
> +static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> +	u32 sid = current_sid();
> +
> +	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
> +			    NULL);
> +}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>  
>  static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
> @@ -7390,6 +7403,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
>  #endif
>  
>  	/*
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 03e82477dce9..8a8f3908aac8 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
>  	{ "perf_event",
>  	  { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
>  	{ "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
> -	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
> +	{ "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
>  	{ "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
>  	/* last one */ { NULL, {} }
>  };

  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-27 17:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-27 15:57 [PATCH v3 1/2] io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed() Hamza Mahfooz
2025-01-27 15:57 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup() Hamza Mahfooz
2025-01-27 17:18   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2025-01-27 21:23     ` Paul Moore
2025-01-28  0:23       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-28 22:35         ` Paul Moore
2025-01-29  0:02           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-01-30 17:15             ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=bd6c2bee-b9bb-4eba-9216-135df204a10e@schaufler-ca.com \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    [email protected] \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox