From: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
To: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>,
<[email protected]>, <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>,
<[email protected]>, Keith Busch <[email protected]>,
[email protected]
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] iouring: one capable call per iouring instance
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2023 13:40:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <[email protected]> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]> (Keith Busch's message of "Mon, 4 Dec 2023 09:53:41 -0800")
I added a CC: linux-security-module@vger
Hi, Keith,
Keith Busch <[email protected]> writes:
> From: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
>
> The uring_cmd operation is often used for privileged actions, so drivers
> subscribing to this interface check capable() for each command. The
> capable() function is not fast path friendly for many kernel configs,
> and this can really harm performance. Stash the capable sys admin
> attribute in the io_uring context and set a new issue_flag for the
> uring_cmd interface.
I have a few questions. What privileged actions are performance
sensitive? I would hope that anything requiring privileges would not be
in a fast path (but clearly that's not the case). What performance
benefits did you measure with this patch set in place (and on what
workloads)? What happens when a ring fd is passed to another process?
Finally, as Jens mentioned, I would expect dropping priviliges to, you
know, drop privileges. I don't think a commit message is going to be
enough documentation for a change like this.
Cheers,
Jeff
>
> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
> ---
> include/linux/io_uring_types.h | 4 ++++
> io_uring/io_uring.c | 1 +
> io_uring/uring_cmd.c | 2 ++
> 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> index bebab36abce89..d64d6916753f0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ enum io_uring_cmd_flags {
> /* set when uring wants to cancel a previously issued command */
> IO_URING_F_CANCEL = (1 << 11),
> IO_URING_F_COMPAT = (1 << 12),
> +
> + /* ring validated as CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable */
> + IO_URING_F_SYS_ADMIN = (1 << 13),
> };
>
> struct io_wq_work_node {
> @@ -240,6 +243,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
> unsigned int poll_activated: 1;
> unsigned int drain_disabled: 1;
> unsigned int compat: 1;
> + unsigned int sys_admin: 1;
>
> struct task_struct *submitter_task;
> struct io_rings *rings;
> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> index 1d254f2c997de..4aa10b64f539e 100644
> --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
> +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> @@ -3980,6 +3980,7 @@ static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p,
> ctx->syscall_iopoll = 1;
>
> ctx->compat = in_compat_syscall();
> + ctx->sys_admin = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> if (!ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
> ctx->user = get_uid(current_user());
>
> diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> index 8a38b9f75d841..764f0e004aa00 100644
> --- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> +++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> @@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
> issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_CQE32;
> if (ctx->compat)
> issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_COMPAT;
> + if (ctx->sys_admin)
> + issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_SYS_ADMIN;
> if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
> if (!file->f_op->uring_cmd_iopoll)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-04 18:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-04 17:53 [PATCH 1/2] iouring: one capable call per iouring instance Keith Busch
2023-12-04 17:53 ` [PATCH 2/2] nvme: use uring_cmd sys_admin flag Keith Busch
2023-12-04 18:05 ` [PATCH 1/2] iouring: one capable call per iouring instance Jens Axboe
2023-12-04 18:45 ` Pavel Begunkov
2023-12-05 16:21 ` Kanchan Joshi
2023-12-06 21:09 ` Keith Busch
2023-12-04 18:15 ` Jens Axboe
2023-12-04 18:40 ` Jeff Moyer [this message]
2023-12-04 18:57 ` Keith Busch
2023-12-05 4:14 ` Ming Lei
2023-12-05 4:31 ` Keith Busch
2023-12-05 5:25 ` Ming Lei
2023-12-05 15:45 ` Keith Busch
2023-12-06 3:08 ` Ming Lei
2023-12-06 15:31 ` Keith Busch
2023-12-07 1:23 ` Ming Lei
2023-12-07 17:48 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-12-04 19:01 ` Jens Axboe
2023-12-04 19:22 ` Jeff Moyer
2023-12-04 19:33 ` Jens Axboe
2023-12-04 19:37 ` Keith Busch
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